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NZ’s push for joint statement on China missile test falls flat amid growing Pacific Islands autonomy_我的网站

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Foreign ministers and top diplomats of the Pacific Islands countries attend a meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in Suva, Fiji, on August 7, 2026, ahead of the full leaders meeting scheduled for September 2026 in Palau. Photo: VCG
As foreign ministers and senior representatives from Pacific nations convened in Suva for the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) to discuss key regional issues, New Zealand's foreign minister reportedly pushed to secure a joint statement condemning China's missile tests in July, however, his effort ultimately fell flat. A Chinese expert described the outcome as a clear rebuke to Canberra and Wellington's ingrained habit of speaking for the Pacific, saying the two countries must come to terms with a shifting reality: Pacific Island states are increasingly unwilling to let Australia and New Zealand dictate who their friends, foes and perceived security threats should be.
Pacific Island foreign ministers failed to agree on Friday to a joint response to China's missile launch in July, with further discussions expected at the Pacific leaders meeting at the end of August, said New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters, according to Reuters.
According to a report from Radio New Zealand, there has not been a unanimous statement from Pacific nations about China's test-launch in July, and Peters said New Zealand had been pushing for one. Peters claimed that the Pacific missed an opportunity not to issue a joint statement soon after China's launch.
Australia's Foreign Minister Penny Wong said before the meeting that she hoped China took note of the "very clear response" already sent from the Pacific about the test, according to AFP.
Peters' push for a joint PIF statement on China's missile tests, together with Wong's remarks, are less about technical security concerns than an effort to turn their own anxieties about China into a regional agenda and pressure Beijing under the forum's collective banner. His description of Pacific Island countries' refusal to single out China as a "missed opportunity" also reveals little respect for their independent judgment, Chen Hong, director of the New Zealand Studies Centre, East China Normal University, told the Global Times.
The result is a clear rebuke to Canberra and Wellington's long-standing habit of arrogantly "speaking for" the Pacific, as island states are increasingly unwilling to let Australia and New Zealand decide who their friends, foes or security threats should be, said Chen Hong.
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy said on July 6 that one of its strategic nuclear submarines successfully launched a strategic missile toward relevant high seas of the Pacific Ocean, which landed precisely within the designated waters. China notified relevant countries in advance of the test launch, a move that demonstrates the openness and transparency of the Chinese armed forces, Chen Xi, a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense, said at a press conference on July 7.
Chen Hong also noted that Peters' recent China-related rhetoric has become increasingly populist and hawkish as elections approach in New Zealand. "Such an approach risks undermining New Zealand's long-standing reputation for pragmatic, independent, and rational diplomacy," Chen Hong said.
In July, during a parliamentary debate on New Zealand's Covid-19 pandemic response, Peters, who is also leader of the populist New Zealand First party, told a Chinese-born lawmaker to "go back to your own country" while mocking his English proficiency. His remarks drew wide criticism in New Zealand.
Yet Australia and New Zealand continued to amplify missile-related issues and great-power rivalry, pushing the "China threat" narrative to the center of the regional agenda while sidelining the priorities that matter most to Pacific Island nations, said Chinese analysts.
Chen Hong noted that for island states, the most urgent concerns are not geopolitical competition but everyday challenges: climate change, energy security, development financing, infrastructure and economic resilience. By shifting the focus from these concerns to strategic rivalry among major powers, Australia and New Zealand risk distorting the region's real priorities and undermining the aspirations of Pacific Island countries.
According to an introduction on the forum website, "The Forum's Pacific Vision is for a resilient region of peace, harmony, security, social inclusion and prosperity, so that all Pacific people can lead free, healthy, and productive lives."
At the opening of the meeting, Rick Houenipwela, foreign minister of the Solomon Islands and chair of the meeting, said that the Pacific's agenda must continue to be "conceived ⁠by the Pacific, shaped by the Pacific and only by the Pacific," according to Reuters.
Chen Hong said Pacific Island nations have made their position clear: differences with China do not mean signing up to the strategic agendas of Australia and New Zealand. A growing number of island countries refuse to be trapped in the black-and-white binary choice of siding with either China or the West.
If Canberra and Wellington keep pushing rhetoric beyond the regional consensus, they risk undermining the very institution they claim to support. The PIF's strength lies not in issuing confrontational statements, but in preserving Pacific unity. Turning that consensus into a tool for pressuring China would erode the forum's cohesion and weaken its central role in the region, said Chen Hong.
。近期，中国台湾地区正在推动一项《能源管理法》修正案，拟要求所有用电负载在5MW以上的商业实体（除学校与医院外）自行建设发电与储能设施。该修正案将于7月22日提交立法机构审议，一旦获得通过，晶圆代工龙头台积电将面临巨大冲击。修法核心变化：从“采购绿电”升级为“自建设施” 据台湾媒体报道，中国台湾地区经济主管部门正主导此次修法，旨在提升半导体及大型数据中心等产业能源用户的自给能力，降低其对电网的过度依赖。此次修法与此前的《再生能源发展条例》要求不同。原法规仅要求大型商业用户通过可再生能源抵消其10%的用电量，而新修正案则更进一步，要求用电负载在5兆瓦（MW）及以上的商业实体必须自行设置发电设备及储能设备。预计该新规将覆盖超过400家半导体、光电、钢铁、石化工厂及人工智能数据中心，仅学校与医院则将获得豁免。台积电首当其冲：年耗电量在全台占比将超10% 作为中国台湾地区当之无愧的“用电第一大户”，台积电无疑将面临最大冲击。

二 | 根据台积电2024年度永续报告书及公开信息，该公司当年在中国台湾地区的厂区总用电量高达255.5亿度，约占中国台湾地区全年总电力消费量的9%。台积电董事长魏哲家今年6月亦公开表示，公司目前消耗台湾地区约10%的电力，且这一比例可能继续上升。

三 | 有投资者研究分析认为，随着2nm等先进制程扩产，台积电2025年总耗电量可能达到310-330亿度，占中国台湾地区总用电量约10.5%-11.2%。台积电岛内产能持续扩大，耗电将持续增长从产能布局来看，台积电在中国台湾地区的产能占其总产能超过80%，包括： 1、6座12英寸超大晶圆厂（GIGAFAB） Fab 12：位于新竹科学园区，是台积电的研发中枢，部分产能已用于2nm及更先进制程的技术研发，也是台积电首座12英寸晶圆厂。

四 | Fab 14：位于台南科学园区，以成熟与特殊制程为主，目前主要生产40nm、65nm等制程，未来可能根据市场需求扩充相关产能。 Fab 15：位于中部科学园区，过去是28nm、20nm等制程的重要生产基地，目前正在进行产线调整，以配合公司整体产能布局。

五 | Fab 18：位于台南科学园区，是台积电先进制程的核心生产基地，全面承担3nm与5nm制程的量产，产能利用率长期处于高位。

六 | Fab 20：位于新竹宝山，是2nm米制程的首发量产基地之一，与高雄的Fab 22共同承担2nm制程的量产任务。

七 | 据供应链消息，Fab 20的月产能规划约5至6万片。

八 | Fab 22 位于高雄，是2纳米制程的另一主要量产基地，已于2025年第四季度开始量产，是台积电先进制程扩产的重要一环。而Fab 22的产能规划更为激进，目标是到2028年底月产能达到14.5万至15万片，届时与Fab 20两厂合计2nm月产能有望达到约20万片。 2、4座8英寸晶圆厂 Fab 3：位于新竹科学园区，主要生产150nm及以上成熟制程的芯片，产品涵盖功率器件、电源管理芯片等。 Fab 5：位于新竹科学园区，同样以150nm及以上成熟制程为主，与Fab 3共同构成台积电8英寸成熟制程产能的基础。 Fab 6：主要生产110nm及以上制程，有市场消息称该厂未来可能转为先进封装用途，但尚未获得官方证实。

九 | Fab 8：位于新竹科学园区，同样以110nm及以上成熟制程为主。台积电四座8英寸晶圆厂的总月产能合计约为52.8万片。

十 | 3、1座6英寸晶圆厂 Fab 2 是台积电目前唯一的6英寸晶圆厂。根据公开规划，该晶圆厂计划于2027年全面停产，未来厂区可能转型为先进封装或其它业务的据点。 4、未来将再建13座先进制程晶圆厂在7月16日的台积电法说会上，台积电董事长魏哲家强调，台积电未来几年同时将在中国台湾建设13座先进制程晶圆厂，继续在中国台湾发展壮大。台积电的技术和制造将持续协助客户实现创新。除了持续扩大晶圆制造产能之外，台积电在台湾岛内还拥有约6座先进封测厂。目前台积电也在持续扩大先进封测产能。显然，随着台积电在台湾岛内的2nm及更先进制程的持续扩产，其电力需求将快速增长，毕竟越先进制程的产线耗电量越高，其中EUV光刻机更是耗电大户。自建电厂挑战艰巨若《能源管理法》修正案通过，台积电接下来将失去电网供电带来的规模经济优势。以255.5亿度的年用电量计算，自建同等规模的发电与储能设施将是一笔巨大的资本开支，并大幅推高其运营成本。根据行业惯例，常规火电项目的单位造价约为每千瓦3000至4000元人民币。以此粗略推算，仅建厂成本就可能在900亿至1200亿元人民币（约合新台币4000亿至5300亿元）级别，这还远未包含后续运营的燃料、维护及财务费用。据台电官网《各种发电方式之发电成本》报告显示，2025年1至3月，可再生能源购电成本为5.80元新台币/度，天然气发电成本3.01元/度，而核能发电成本仅1.76元/度。

十一 | 由于近年来中国台湾在推动去核化，以高成本电力替代低成本的核电，无疑将增加台电的发电成本，进而对电价形成冲击。对于台积电来说，自建火电厂的初期投资巨大，虽然运营成本相对可控，但是需要获得稳定的燃料供应，而台湾岛内则化石燃料匮乏，严重依赖于进口。这也意味着可能需要面对像今年美伊冲突所导致的能源供应受阻和价格剧烈波动。但如果采用可再生能源发电，不仅将面临巨大的建设成本和运维成本，而且存在严重的供电不稳定性。这也正是台积电等大规模工业用户在考虑自发电时面临的核心经济困境。此外，随着AI数据中心用电量的爆发式增长，中国台湾地区电力市场正面临前所未有的压力。星星电力总经理关怡婷表示，“大家都知道台积电在台湾地区用电占了10%，他们对绿电的需求确实非常强劲。” 一旦法案通过，不仅台积电，数百家用电大户都将面临能源基础设施的重构。该修正案预计将为企业提供一定的安装缓冲期，并对未达标者设置相应罚款。对于台积电而言，此次能源政策转向，或将成为影响其全球竞争力的关键变量。